Maps to
IEC 81001-5-1: §5.7.4
Requirement text
The manufacturer shall establish an activity (or activities) to identify and characterize weaknesses via tests that focus on discovering and exploiting security vulnerabilities in the health software.
What changed
IEC 81001-5-1:2021 is the first standalone cybersecurity standard purpose-built for health software and medical device software. Published in December 2021, it was adapted from IEC 62443-4-1 (industrial control systems security) to address the unique safety and regulatory context of medical devices — adding 64 health-specific requirements that account for patient safety, clinical workflows, and the manufacturer-HDO relationship.
The standard mirrors IEC 62304's lifecycle structure but adds security-specific activities at every phase — planning, development, testing, release, and maintenance. It requires security risk management to be integrated with ISO 14971 safety risk management, not treated as a separate IT concern. FDA formally recognized it as Consensus Standard #13-112 in December 2022 and references it as providing a framework for the Secure Product Development Framework (SPDF) required by Section 524B.
EU MDR harmonization was originally targeted for May 2024 but postponed to May 2028. Despite this delay, Notified Bodies and Competent Authorities universally recognize it as "state of the art" for health software cybersecurity under MDR GSPR Annex I, Section 17.2. Missing or inadequate cybersecurity documentation is already a top cause of Notified Body major non-conformities for SaMD. A December 2025 Interpretation Sheet (ISH1:2025) clarified software item classification into maintained, supported, and required software categories, affecting risk transfer and post-market obligations.
Atomic constraints
- •Penetration testing activities must be established.
- •Penetration testing must focus on discovering security vulnerabilities.
- •Penetration testing must include attempting to exploit discovered vulnerabilities.
- •Weaknesses found must be identified and characterized.
Common gaps
Penetration testing scope not derived from threat model
majorPenetration tests are performed as black-box testing without scoping to the threat model's identified attack surfaces. FDA expects tests on the final production-equivalent version covering network, application, and firmware layers. Generic pen testing misses device-specific attack vectors.
Evidence signals
- •
FILE_EXISTS
Penetration.*Test|Pen.*Test|Security.*Assessment|Red.*Team
- •
CONTENT_MATCH
Does this document describe penetration testing activities aimed at discovering and exploiting security vulnerabilities, with findings characterized, documented, and tracked to resolution?
Audit defense
The Penetration Test report for [your product] (Doc ID: [your document ID]) documents adversarial testing activities focused on discovering and exploiting security vulnerabilities, with all identified weaknesses characterized, logged in the problem resolution process, and dispositioned prior to release.